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In The

Supreme Court of the United States
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

VALERIE HANEY,
Petitioner,
v.
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL
AND RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER,
DAVID MISCAVIGE, AND DOES 1-25,
Respondents.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The Court Of Appeal Of California
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

MOTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
TORTS, AND RELIGION PROFESSORS AND
SCHOLARS TO FILE BRIEF AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

Amici curiae Constitutional Law, Torts, and Religion Professors and Scholars respectfully request leave
of the Court to file the following brief in this case. Petitioner’s attorney has granted its consent to the filing
of this brief. Counsel for respondents, however, has not
responded to amici’s request for consent.
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The amici believe that sending Valerie Haney’s severe torts case to religious arbitration violates her constitutional rights under the First Amendment. We ask
this Court to file our brief explaining why Haney’s
wrongs should be litigated in court and not in religious
arbitration.
We therefore ask this Court to grant certiorari in
this case and to rule that this particular case, Haney’s
case, should be tried in court, not limited to religious
arbitration.
Respectfully submitted,
LESLIE C. GRIFFIN, ESQ.
Counsel of Record
UNLV BOYD SCHOOL OF LAW
4505 S. Maryland Parkway
Box 451003
Las Vegas, NV, 89154-1003
(713) 301-3105
leslie.griffin@unlv.edu
Attorney for Amici Curiae
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BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
The amici curiae respectfully move for this Court
to accept our brief, and then ask that the petition for a
writ of certiorari be granted.1
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

INTERESTS OF THE AMICI CURIAE
Amici are professors and scholars of constitutional
law, torts, and religion who understand that some
members and former members of religions are subjected to tort harm and suffer serious damages from it,
just as other people do. We believe that tort victims will
receive due process of law to resolve their injuries in
civil courts, and not in arbitration run by the tortfeasors themselves. The tortfeasors’ arbitration hearing
would not give justice to the injured Petitioner, Valerie
Haney, in this case.
We ask this Court to grant certiorari in order to
recognize the rights of the Petitioner to have her tort
case heard in court. Religious freedom does not require
tort injuries to be resolved by the church itself. Instead,
the First Amendment protects the right of the individual to leave a religion, as Haney did in this case. We
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Counsel for amici curiae authored this brief in whole and
no other person or entity other than amici or their counsel has
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission
of this brief. Petitioner granted consent to file.
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ask this court to give Valerie Haney a legal chance at
receiving justice.
The amici are:
Angela C. Carmella
Professor of Law
Seton Hall University School of Law
Katya Dow
Professor of Practice
University of Houston Law Center
Benjamin Edwards
Associate Professor, Director of the
Public Policy Clinic
University of Nevada, Las Vegas Boyd
School of Law
Steven K. Green, J.D., Ph.D.
Fred H. Paulus Professor of Law and Director
Center for Religion, Law and Democracy
Willamette University
Angela D. Morrison
Professor of Law
Texas A&M University School of Law
Michael A. Olivas
William B. Bates Distinguished Chair of Law
(emeritus)
University of Houston Law Center
Laura Oren
Professor Emerita
University of Houston Law Center
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Andrew L. Seidel
Constitutional Attorney
Author of The Founding Myth: Why Christian
Nationalism is Un-American
Jim Starzynski
Guardian ad Litem and Youth Attorney
Corrales, NM
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The First Amendment protects the religious freedom of individuals to leave any and every religion. It
defends their freedom to select the religion or non-religion of their choice. The choice to join or leave a religion is the choice of the individual alone. The church
does not make that decision for her or him.
Religious institutions sometimes commit torts
against their members and do them real harm. The
harm may continue even after the individual leaves
the church. Those religious institutions do not argue
that the torts are protected religious practice or that
they have religious obligation to do harm to others.
They know that these torts are against the law.
Nonetheless, these religious institutions, like
other tortfeasors, prefer not to pay for those injuries.
One way to avoid justice is for the religious institution
itself to judge whether it was guilty and harmed its
member. This is a particularly odious choice when the
individual, like Petitioner Valerie Haney in this case,
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left the religion because of its constant harm to her as
both member and then as a non-member.
Haney’s seven requests to leave Scientology were
denied. “On one occasion, [she] was physically restrained and prevented from leaving.” She “escaped
successfully by hiding in the trunk of another person’s
car.” She returned to Scientology’s base because they
threatened her with loss of contact with her mother
and brother. She was “forcibly held on the base and
‘forced to do everything with a “handler,” including
using the bathroom, showering, and sleeping.’ ” Postdeparture, Scientology “stalked, followed, surveilled,
and harassed her.” They followed her car and almost
ran her off the road. Cert. Petition, Valerie Haney
v. Church of Scientology et al., May 26, 2021,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/20/20-1647/
178763/20210518140339537_40511%20pdf%20Majewski
%20br.pdf, at 4.
And more. Id.
Haney wants to bring these terrible claims before
courts that obey the laws of the United States and will
listen to her stories of serious harm inflicted by members of Scientology.
This Court understands that the courts of the
United States exist to bring relief and justice to
harmed individuals. If, instead, tort victims who are
former members of the religion are subjected to their
former church’s religious law instead of state tort law,
their rights are limited.
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If Valerie Haney is subjected to religious arbitration by her former religion, her Free Exercise right to
leave a religion is undermined. The Establishment
Clause is also violated whenever the courts subject
free individuals to religious law instead of to the laws
of the states, which are supposed to protect them
against harm.
This Court must stand with the courts that
learned the lesson that organizations, regardless of religious affiliation, should be punished, not rewarded,
for their torts, and rewarded only when they act in the
best interests of the individuals they serve, and consistent with the laws of the United States. See, e.g.,
Geoff Mcmaster, Researchers Reveal Patterns of Sexual Abuse in Religious Settings, Folio, Aug. 5, 2020,
https://www.ualberta.ca/folio/2020/08/researchers-revealpatterns-of-sexual-abuse-in-religious-settings.html.
The United States has a proud history of recognizing that apostasy is not a crime. Apostasy is “an
act of refusing to continue to follow, obey, or recognize a religious faith.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/apostasy.
Other nations, however, continue to prosecute apostasy, even giving death sentences for it. See, e.g., Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129 (1982).
In arbitration as in apostasy, this Court must clarify for the lower courts that tortfeasors are subject to
the laws of the United States, which punish them
when they do wrong. Allowing them to determine
their own tort liability violates the First Amendment.
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Allowing churches to block members from leaving
would be just like allowing the government to prosecute individuals for apostasy. This Court must make
clear that violations of the law belong in the courts of
the United States, not religious courts.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

ARGUMENT
I.

The Free Exercise Clause Protects the Individual’s Right to Exit a Religion

The First Amendment protects an individual’s religious freedom right to leave a church as well as to join
one. Free exercise protects the right to “convert from
one faith to another.” Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987). Without such
freedom, individuals would be enslaved to their
churches in a way that both the Free Exercise Clause
and the Establishment Clause prohibit. The courts
need to be clear that religious freedom must not end
all secular law. Subjecting a former Scientologist to
Scientology’s religious judgment undermines Haney’s
free exercise right to leave her church. “The right to
believe, or not to believe, in any religion has a necessary corollary: the right to change one’s beliefs. It is
this right that is endangered in court enforcement of
religious arbitration orders.” Nicholas Walter, Religious Arbitration in the United States and Canada, 52
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 501, 549 (2012).
The First Amendment usually blocks individuals
from suing their churches “over matters of significant
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religious concern.” Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise
Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of Hosanna-Tabor,
108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183, 1203 (2014). The courts
learned from the child abuse cases that such abuse is
not a matter of religious concern. No Respondent in
this case claims that the right to assault, imprison, and
abuse Valerie Haney is a religious duty that Scientology must undertake. As California has held, “internal
church dispute[s]” are not subject to judicial review,
but a “criminal investigation into suspected child molestation allegedly committed by Catholic priest” is.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles v. Superior
Court, 131 Cal. App. 4th 417, 432 (2005), as modified
on denial of reh’g (Aug. 16, 2005). This case, like Roman Catholic Archbishop, involves investigation of illegal conduct by Respondents, and should be reviewed
in court, not dismissed as an internal church matter.
Valerie Haney has suffered great damage and, like
other victims of abuse, wants justice from the courts to
begin to heal those wounds.
This case reminds us that the “Free Exercise
Clause is implicated only when the government interferes with religious beliefs or conduct. . . . This is why
the regular tort rules apply to someone hit by the
church bus or by a falling gargoyle. Those suits
threaten no religious practice.” Lund, supra, at 1204.
Haney’s harassment, imprisonment, and assault are
just like being hit by a church bus or a falling gargoyle.
The terrible torts in this case do not threaten any
Scientology religious practice. The courts would not be
reviewing any religious practice or belief when they
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consider the torts committed against Haney. Therefore,
the wrongs should be reviewed by the courts, not by
the church’s own members.
Petitioner asks this Court to remember that everyone, religious and non-religious, must obey “neutral
laws of general applicability.” Employment Division,
Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990). A religious arbitration by individuals who
must be loyal to Scientology would not protect those
laws as neutrally as the courts would. Such an arbitration would not be impartial, as it is expected to be. If
this court applied strict scrutiny, the government’s
“compelling state interest” in protecting individuals
from physical and mental harm would far outweigh
the need to support Respondents’ claim to selfcentered arbitration. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
“An important free exercise right is the right to
exit a religion.” Marianne Grano, Divine Disputes: Why
and How Michigan Courts Should Revisit Church
Property Law, 64 WAYNE L. REV. 269, 284 (2018). Valerie Haney is a church outsider, not an insider; outsiders “have constitutional rights to be free from the
power of other peoples’ churches.” Lund, supra at 1204.
If Haney’s case goes to arbitration, she would be subject to the power of other peoples’ church. “An important aspect of church autonomy is how every
insider has the right to leave, the right to become an
outsider. Maybe this is part of the church autonomy
principle itself; maybe it describes the limits of church
autonomy. But either way, church autonomy implies a

9
constitutional right of exit from religious organizations.” Id. at 1203.
States have long recognized the difference between a church outsider and a church insider. In Oklahoma, for example, Marian Guinn left the Church of
Christ after they subjected her to discipline. Although
Guinn had abandoned her church membership, the
church nonetheless read its disparaging remarks
about Guinn to church members. Church Elders believed one can never withdraw from church membership.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed, and upheld the jury’s verdict for actual and punitive damages
for the torts of outrage and invasion of privacy. Guinn
v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 768
(Okla. 1989). The “shield from liability evaporates for
claims that arise after a member has separated from
the church and is no longer a church member.” Id.
Three years later, the court repeated its recognition
that “the church has no power over those who live outside of the spiritual community.” Hadnot v. Shaw, 826
P.2d 978, 988 (Okla. 1992).
In a 2017 case citing Guinn, the court noted “we
were unequivocal, ‘[j]ust as freedom to worship is protected by the First Amendment, so also is the liberty to
recede from one’s religious allegiance.’ . . . We went further: ‘The First Amendment clearly safeguards the
freedom to worship as well as the freedom not to worship.’ ” Doe v. First Presbyterian Church U.S.A. of Tulsa,
421 P.3d 284, 290 (2017) (citing Guinn, 775 P.2d at 776)
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(emphasis added). All courts should be unequivocal
that the right to exit a church is constitutionally protected, as it must be for the Petitioner here.
This Court should recognize Valerie Haney’s constitutionally protected right to exit by allowing her
lawsuit to proceed in court. Just like Guinn’s church,
Scientology cannot take away its members’ freedom by
asserting their view that membership continues even
after the members make numerous efforts to leave. If
a non-member must be subjected to religious arbitration, she has lost all the freedom that the Free Exercise
Clause is supposed to protect. It is as limiting as if the
United States courts allowed her to be prosecuted for
apostasy. We ask this Court to clarify that this case
cannot be subjected to religious arbitration, even when
other cases must be.
Now is the time for this Court to make clear, and
to reiterate, that the Free Exercise Clause does not
protect Scientology’s right to assault Valerie Haney, to
block and undermine her exit from the church, and
then to allow their own agents to decide just how bad
the facts are. We ask this Court to grant certiorari so
it can state clearly that Haney’s lawsuit can proceed in
court, not in religious arbitration.
II.

The Establishment Clause Prevents the
Courts from “Subordinating Secular Law
to Holy Texts”

Arbitration is different from court law. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Arbitration’s Dark Shadow, 18 NEV.
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L.J. 427, 431 (2018). Although judges, in courts, have
an obligation to state the law correctly, arbitrators do
not owe the public any such duty. Id. at 432. Sending
disputes to arbitration often undermines the law itself.
“Today, arbitration casts a long, dark shadow that obscures information that would otherwise be available.
It now cloaks countless conflicts. Unlike disputes resolved through public courts that allow the public to
access information, disputes resolved through arbitration deprive the public of significant information. This
absence of information alters behavior and undercuts
reputation’s critical role in a free economy. Defendants
face substantially lower reputational risks for abusive
practices when allegations may be resolved through
private, secretive arbitration.” Id. at 427-28.
Some arbitration also violates the Establishment
Clause. “[T]he individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to
select any religious faith or none at all.” Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985). The Establishment
Clause blocks the government from preferring religion
over non-religion, and from “openly subordinating secular law to holy texts.” Sophia Chua-Rubenfeld &
Frank J. Costa, Jr., Comment: The Reverse-Entanglement Principle: Why Religious Arbitration of Federal
Rights Is Unconstitutional, 128 YALE L.J. 2087, 2094
(2019). Forcing a non-member into religious arbitration not only undermines the Free Exercise Clause,
but also violates the Establishment Clause. The
courts may not force individuals into religious arbitration when they have left a religion behind. These
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“arbitrators might be committed to an entirely different legal tradition—one in which religious principles,
not secular statutes, reign supreme.” Id.
Americans frequently change their religions. “The
Pew Forum survey summarized that religious affiliation in the United States is both very diverse and extremely fluid. More than one-quarter of American
adults (twenty-eight percent) have left the faith in
which they were raised in favor of another religion or
no religion at all. If change in affiliation from one type
of Protestantism to another is included, forty-four percent of adults have either switched religious affiliation
or dropped any connection to a specific religious tradition altogether.” Maimon Schwarzschild, How Much
Autonomy Do You Want?, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1105,
1120 n. 66 (2014) (citing The Pew Forum on Religion &
Pub. Life, U.S. Religious Landscape Survey 5 (2010),
available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/reportreligious-landscape-study-full.pdf ). See also Shai Silverman, Before the Godly: Religious Arbitration and
the U.S. Legal System, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 719, 740-41
(2017) (“The first problem arises from the fact that
faith is not immutable—one’s relationship to God and
one’s religious community can change drastically over
time.”). Changing religions is an American freedom
that is undermined whenever the courts allow religious arbitration to block the right to leave a religion.
In 2019, California legislation banned employers
from using forced arbitration to settle sexual harassment claims. Terrina Lavallee, Current Developments
2019-2020: The Ethics of Religious Arbitration, 33 GEO.
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J. LEGAL ETHICS 629 (2020). This law is consistent with
Lavallee’s analysis that arbitration is not good for everyone and does not protect everyone’s civil rights. Id.;
see also Edwards, supra. In particular, scholars have
concluded arbitration may benefit employers while doing harm to employees. Id. The same principle should
apply to religious arbitration, which in many circumstances may be forced, as it is in this case. This case
involves a mandatory arbitration because, as in the
Guinn case, it is church punishment that the church
wants to impose even when the person is no longer a
member of a church.
As Lavallee has argued, civil courts can prevent
abuses of the arbitration system. “Yet, parties subject
to religious arbitration who would benefit from civil
court protection must over-come three hurdles: civil
courts’ extreme deference to arbitration, the religious
question doctrine, and unequal bargaining power in
employment contexts. These hurdles eviscerate potential judicial oversight from secular courts of religious
arbitration.” Lavallee, supra, at 637.
Although the Federal Arbitration Act favors arbitration, 9 U.S.C. § 10-11, there is no reason to defer to
arbitration on this set of facts. Moreover, there is no
reason for the courts to favor religious arbitration in
this lawsuit, as there is no religious question involved.
“[R]eligious arbitration has the effect of limiting freedom of religion, and therefore it should be used only
when the dispute has a religious subject matter that
civil courts are not equipped to handle.” Nicholas Walter, Religious Arbitration in the United States and
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Canada, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 501, 542-43 (2012).
This case is a legal torts matter of a former member of
Scientology. Haney has raised strictly legal questions
of tort law that can be reviewed by the courts. The torts
courts will apply legal principles; the religious arbitration conducted by loyal Scientology members cannot be
trusted to do so. The courts will apply “neutral principles of law” and determine whether harm was done
and whether there should be any damages assessed.
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 597 (1979).
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the government from encouraging or
promoting (“establishing”) religion in any way. Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 408 U.S. 602 (1971). The Establishment
Clause bans actions that even Free Exercise may permit. See Chua-Rubenfeld, supra. In addition to freeing
religions from government interference, it “ ‘rescue[s]
temporal institutions from religious interference.’ ” Id.
at 2107 (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15
(1947)). This Court’s important case, Jones v. Wolf, reminds us that secular legal issues can be reviewed on
“purely secular terms.” 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979). The
Establishment Clause recognizes “a reverse-entanglement principle, under which courts should not authorize religion-infused adjudication of secular rights.”
Situations like this case, in which “religious adjudication threatens the integrity of secular law,” violate
the Establishment Clause. Chua-Rubenfeld, supra, at
2110.
This case renews the worry that “judicial enforcement of religious arbitration agreements would allow
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religious institutions to acquire effective control over
the government’s power to enforce the civil law.” Brian
Hutler, Religious Arbitration and the Establishment
Clause, 33 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 337, 340 (2018).
See also Jeff Dasteel, Religious Arbitration Agreements
in Contracts of Adhesion, 8 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION
45 (2016) (use of these agreements also violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Edwards, supra, at
431 (“Arbitration and private dispute resolution remove a discovery and broadcast channel for reputational information, making it less likely that non-legal
market forces will deter misbehavior.”). We ask this
Court to grant certiorari to reiterate that courts must
follow and enforce secular law when the facts can be
reviewed on “purely secular terms.” Jones, 443 U.S. at
604. That conclusion would not apply to all religious
arbitration cases, but should apply to Valerie Haney’s
specific set of facts.
The holding of the California court permitting
the religion to decide Haney’s claims is akin to state
sanctioned punishment for apostasy, which is forbidden by the Constitution and the United States’ agreement with the 2019 Statement on Blasphemy and
Apostasy Laws. See U.S. Department of State, Statement on Blasphemy and Apostasy Laws, July 18,
2019, https://www.state.gov/statement-on-blasphemyand-apostasy-laws/ (“We stand in firm opposition to
laws that, inconsistent with the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, impede the freedom of individuals to choose a faith, practice a faith, change their
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religion, not have a religion, tell others about their beliefs and practices, or openly debate and discuss aspects of faith or belief.”).
The California court’s rule requiring religious arbitration in this case makes it impossible for Haney to
leave her religion, just as apostasy laws punish individuals for departing their faith. This Court needs to
clarify that the Religion Clauses protect Haney’s right
to leave her religion. She has a right to submit her secular tort law claims to the courts. The decision below,
as it stands now, is like punishing her for apostasy,
something that this Court would never tolerate.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

CONCLUSION
As this Court well understands, “no person may be
obliged to believe in any faith, or not to believe in any
faith. This point was made most famously in the Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments of James Madison: ‘The Religion then of every
man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise
it as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an
unalienable right.’ ” Nicholas Walter, Religious Arbitration in the United States and Canada, 52 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 501, 547-48 (2012).
We ask this Court to protect Valerie Haney’s unalienable rights. We ask that you hear this case and explain that these terrible tort claims should be heard in
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court, where Valery Haney can receive full due process
of law.
For the foregoing reasons, amici urge the Court to
grant certiorari in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
LESLIE C. GRIFFIN, ESQ.
Counsel of Record
UNLV BOYD SCHOOL OF LAW
4505 S. Maryland Parkway
Box 451003
Las Vegas, NV, 89154-1003
(713) 301-3105
leslie.griffin@unlv.edu
Attorney for Amici Curiae

